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determining whether such act was privileged or forbidden.'s Such may
in the future become the law of nations also. As that law has thus
far been established, however, no inquiry is permitted into the purpose
of a nation in excluding a commodity from its territories; and it is
certain that no nation is bound to submit the soundness of its welfare
policies to any international court or jury. The United States in an
international controversy would have no burden of showing more than
that its act was an exercise of privileged jurisdiction. It need not
allege or prove liquor to be a noxious poison, a dangerous drug, or an
agent of human degeneration. It may rest its case, as the Supreme
Court did in considering the international phase of its decision, on privi-
leged jurisdiction.
It might be suggested by one or more foreign states that the United
States submit this issue to an international court. Should the latter
accede to such a request, it is believed that the international court should
decide in favor of the privileged jurisdiction of the United States
asserted in the Amendment and the National Prohibition Act as inter-
preted by the Supreme Court of the United States.14
HARD CASES MAKE GOOD LAW
When a stated rule of law works injustice in a particular case; that is,
would determine it contrary to "the settled convictions of the com-
munity," - the rule is pretty certain either to be denied outright or to be
undermined by a fiction or a specious distinction. It is said that "hard
cases make bad law;" but it can be said with at least as much truth that
hard cases make good law. It was largely the crystallization of the
rules of the common law that caused the constant appeals to the con-
science of the king and his chancellor, and developed the system of law
that we know as equity. Even the common law judges themselves had
a "conscience." When their stated rules developed hard cases, the rules
were modified by the use of fiction, by exceptions and distinctions, and
even by direct overruling.
In the well-worn and "elementary" subject of consideration for a
promise, it is generally laid down as beyond question that performance
'Stevens v. Kelley (1886) 78 Me. 445, 452; Barclay v. Abraham (1903) 121
Iowa, 61g, 96 N. W. io8o; Tuttle v. Buck (igog) o7 Minn. 145, i1g N. W. 946;
25 L. R. A. (x. s.) 831, note; 52 L. R. A. (x. s.) 736, note.
" "The rule, now generally recognized," is that stated in Patterson v. Eudora,
supra note 8, at p. 178, 23 Sup. Ct. at p. 824: "Indeed, the implied consent to
permit them [foreign merchant ships] to enter our harbors may be withdrawn,
and if this implied consent may be wholly withdrawn it may be extended upon
such terms and conditions as the government sees fit to impose."
See Wheeler, C. J., in Dwy v. Connecticut Co. (1914) 89 Conn. 74, 99, 92
Atl. 883, 891; Young, The Law as an Expression of Community Ideals (1917)
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in accordance with a pre-existing legal duty is not legally operative as
a consideration for a return promise.2 This is true whether the duty
was (i) the duty of a public officer,2 (2) the duty of a husband to his
wife,4 (3) the duty of a contractor based upon his contract with the
promisor,5 or (4) the duty of a contractor to a third person created by
a contract to which the present promisor was not a party.' It is in the
fourth of these classes that the most serious doubt exists as to the
justice and soundness of the general rule ;7 but there is some conflict in
the other classes also, and particularly in class three.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut has just held in Sasso v. K. G.
& G. Realty & Const. Co. (1923) 98 Conn. 571, 12o Atl. 158, a case
belonging in class three above, that the promise of the defendant to pay
a larger sum for work already contracted for was.a binding promise.
The plaintiff had contracted to furnish for a named price the labor and
materials for all tile work on a building being erected by the defendant.
Before the time for performance, tile greatly increased in cost and was
hard to get at any price. The plaintiff informed the defendant of these
facts and also said "that he could not proceed with the completion of
his work unless defendant would pay, in addifion to the contract price,
the difference between the cost of tile as originally figured . . . . and
the cost of tile that could now be secured." The defendant in writing
promised to pay this additional sum "in order to assist you in completing
your contract." As the court elsewhere expresses it, "as an inducement
to the plaintiff to continue, expedite, and complete the performance of
the contract, defendants agreed with plaintiff upon a modification of the
original contract to the effect that the defendants would pay the plaintiff,
in addition to the contract price, the difference," etc.
The court held that the new promise of the defendants was based on
sufficient consideration, saying: "the plaintiff was, without fault on his
part, in a position where he could not carry out his contract with the
quality of tile contracted for. The defendants were confronted with an
approaching breach of contract by the plaintiff. Instead of awaiting
such breach and relying on an action upon the breach, they preferred
to contract with the plaintiff to complete the contract with inferior tile
'Anson, Contract (Corbin's ed. 1919) secs. 136-144; Williston, Contracts (1920)
ch. VI.
'Bridge v. Cage (1605, C. P.) Cro. Jac. 1O3; Gray v. Martino (igi ) 91
N. J. L. 462, 1O3 AtI. 24.
'Ryan v. Dockery (19o8) 134 Wis. 431, 114 N. W. 820.
'Stilk v. Myrick (i8io, C. P.) 2 Camp. 317; Davis v. Morgan (19o3) 117
Ga. 504, 43 S. E. 732. Contra: Munroe v. Perkins (1830, Mass.) 9 Pick. 298.
6 Vanderbilt v. Schreyer (1883) 91 N. Y. 392; McDevitt v. Stokes (1917)
,74 Ky. 515, 192 S. W. 681. Cf. De Cicco v. Schweizer (1917) 221 N. Y. 431,
117 N. E. 8o7. Contra: Shadwell v. Shadwell (186o) 3o L. 3. C. P. 145; Abbott
v. Doane (1895) 163 Mass. 433, 4o N. E. 197.
" See Corbin, Does a Pre-existing Duty Defeat Consideration? (1918) 27 YALE
LAw JOURN A, 362.
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costing more money .... This constitutes a rescission or abandonment
of the original contract and the making of a new contract which is based
on a valid consideration, namely, the mutual promises there made by
the parties."
There is no doubt that as long as a contract remains bilateral-that
is, as long as the parties are still under mutual executory duties-it can
be "rescinded" by mere expressions of assent thereto. An agreement
of rescission, like other agreements, requires the element of considera-
tion; but mutual consideration is to be found in the extinguishment of
the legal right still possessed by each, correlative to the duty of the
other. If in the instant case, therefore, the parties had agreed upon
a mutual rescission-the contract still being bilateral in its character-
a new agreement made thereafter would have been binding even though
the builder promised to do only the very same work as before and the
owner promised to pay a larger sum than before. Neither would be
promising a performance that the law still required of him. To a
number of courts, as in the present case, this has seemed to offer a
means of avoiding, in cases of hardship, the rule that performance in
accordance with a pre-existing duty is not an operative consideration.,
But unless the mutual rescission is distinctly antecedent in time to the
new agreement,9 leaving both parties "in perfect freedom to refuse to
enter into any further contractual relationship with each other,"10 the
case falls exactly within the terms of the supposed general rule, there
is no true rescission, and the distinction drawn is a distinction without -
a difference. 1
'Munroe v. Perkins, supra note 5; Schwartzreich v. Bauman-Basch, Inc. (igi8,
Sup. Ct.) 1O5 Misc. 214, 172 N. Y. Supp. 683; affirmed (1921) 231 N. Y. I96,
131 N. E. 887. If the contract promises some new and different performance,
that fact supplies sufficient consideration for the defendant's promise. In the
instant case, a promise by the contractor to furnish a kind of tile not provided
for in the original contract would operate as consideration, even though the
quality of such new tile was not so good as that originally required. From the
entire report, however, it seems that the defendant merely promised a larger sum
for such complete or defective performance as might be found practicable.
'Of course, it is a question of fact whether there was an agreement of
rescission antecedent in time. See Williston, Contracts (192o) sec. i3oa. This
question can be left to the jury as it was in Schwartzreich v. Baunan-Basch,
supra note 8. In such cases, if the jury thinks that the new promise ought to
be enforced, they will bring in a verdict that there was a rescission antecedent in
time. In a case of this sort, however, it is not desirable to leave the modification
of the law to the jury, for the jury can modify the law only by consciously or
unconsciously distorting the facts. See (1919) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 4o6.
"' Mullan, J., in the Schwartzreich case, supra note 8. "Perfect freedom" here
includes the legal privilege of not performing as previously agreed, as well as
the power and privilege of making and accepting new offers.
'In the Schwartzreich case, supra note 8, the plaintiff had made a bilateral,
written contract with the defendant to serve him for a year at $go per week.
Just before the time set for beginning work, the defendant agreed to pay $ioo
per week for the work, and the writing was torn up. The change was made
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With great deference, it is believed that the facts as stated by the court
in the instant case show no "rescission" of the original contract and no
because of the fact that wages in general were rapidly rising because of war
conditions. In this case the New York Court of Appeals said: "Any change
in an existing contract, such as the modification of the rate of compensation, or
a supplemental agreement, must have a consideration to support it. In such a case
the contract is continued, not ended. Where, however, an existing contract is ter-
minated by consent of both parties and a new one executed in its place and stead,
we have a different situation and the mutual promises are again a consideration.
Very little difference may appear in a mere change of compensation in an existing
and continuing contract and a termination of one contract and the making of a
new one for the same time and work, but at an increased compensation. There
is, however, a marked difference in principle. Where the new contract gives any
new privilege or advantage to the promisee, a consideration has been recognized,
though in the main it is the same contract. ...
"All concede that an agreement may be rescinded by mutual consent and a new
agreement made thereafter on any terms to which the parties may assent...
"The same effect follows in our judgment from a new contract entered into
at the same time the old one is destroyed and rescinded by mutual consent. The
determining factor is the rescission by consent. Provided this is the expressed
and acted upon intention, the time of the rescission, whether a moment before or
at the same time as the making of the new contract, is unimportant." . ..
It should be observed, first, that "a new privilege or advantage to the promisee"
can never make a promise binding. Of course, a raise of $io per week is an
advantage to the employee. A promised gift is always an advantage to the
promisee. But it is the promisor whose advantage may operate as a consideration.
A promise cannot be supported by its own bootstraps. Secondly, if the "rescis-
sion" is simultaneous with the new agreement for increased compensation for the
same work, there is no rescission at all. Suppose the following cases:
(i) Employer says: "I will pay you $io more a week." Employee: "I accept
and will do the work." -
(2) Employer: "I offer a rescission of the old and the substitution of a new
contract for the same work at $io a week more." Employee: "I accepi and will
do the work."
(3) Employer: "I release you from your duty to work and promise you $Ioo
per week if you will promise to do the same work and will release me from my
duty to pay you $go per week." Employee: "I accept, promise to do the same
work, and release you from your duty."
Observe that the operative effect in all three of these is identical. Beforehand
the employee was under a duty to do specified work, and the employer to pay
$9o per week. Afterwards, the employee is under the same duty to do the same
work. The only change, if the new agreement is operative at all, is in the
employer's duty. It is a change from go to ioo. There is not an instant of time
at which the employee is free from his duty to work. The employer's words of
release are quite inoperative; they are intended to become operative only when
the new contract of employment becomes operative, and so they do not become
operative at all. It is just as if the employer said, "I release you; but if you
accept, I do not release you;" or "I release you if you will remain under the
identical duty from which I release you." As held in a mining case, McCann v.
McMillan (igoo) 129 Calif. 35o, 62 Pac. 31, there is no abandonment when one
goes on his claim and says: 'I abandon this claim, but I relocate it and again
make claim to it'
The plaintiff gets judgment, therefore, not because he has promised anything
new or anything that he was not at the instant of the promise under an existing
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new piomise of any sort by the plaintiff. The plaintiff was not dis-
charged from his contractual duty by the unexpected difficulty or expense
of performance, and it does not appear that the defendants intended to
free him from such duty.for even a single instant of time. It is believed
that to rest a decision upon an inferential "rescission" is to rest it upon
a fiction, and that it would be better to rest it frankly upon the rule that
performance in accordance with a pre-existing contract is legally opera-
tive as a consideration in cases of hardship or cases where the plaintiff's
conduct is not morally blameworthy. 12 The instant decision can also be
justified for reasons stated in the footnote below.'
3
A. L. C.
MOB-DOMINATION OF STATE COURTS AND FEDERAL REVIEW BY
HABEAS CORPUS
Do state court litigants have a federal right not to be deprived of life
or liberty by mob-dominated tribunals? What are the means of enforc-
ing the right if it exists? These questions were before the Supreme
Court of the United States in the recent case of Moore v. Dempsey
(Feb. 19, 1923) Oct. Term, 1922, No. 199. Five negroes had been
convicted of murder in an Arkansas Court, and their convictions were
duty to do, not because there is a "difference in principle" between a modification
and this kind of a "rescission," but because we want him to have the money that
the defendant promised. To reach this result we should say in words, what we
must say in effect, that on facts like these doing or promising to do what one is
under an existing legal duty to do is a sufficient consideration for a promise.
King v. Duluth, M. & N. Ry. Co. (1895) 61 Minn. 482, 63 N. W. 11o5;
Lina v. Schuck (i9o7) io6 Md. 22o, 67 Atl. 286; Corbin, op. cit. supra note 7.
It appeared that the defendants had actually paid to the plaintiff, in accordance
with the new promise and in order to enable him to pay cash for the tile procured
by him, the entire extra cost of such tile. The defendants are now seeking to
have such payments credited against the original contract price in a mechanic's
lien action to collect a balance. From this it seems that the defendants should
lose, irrespective of whether their new promise was valid or not. The payments
made were specifically directed by the defendants as performance of the new
promise and not as payments on general account. They were therefore executed
gifts, even if not based on consideration, and the defendants had no power to
recall them or to apply them later on other accounts. The decision is not based
on this reasoning however.
If the plaintiff had definitely repudiated his contract, it might be held as in
Hong, Hoon, et al. v. Lurn Wai (1922) 26 Hawaii, 54, that such repudiation
extinguished- his contractual duty, substituting a secondary duty to pay damages,
thus enabling the court to hold that his subsequent performance was not
required by the original and still continuing contractual duty. (See comment by
Professor Cook in [1923] 32 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 380; also Shaw v. Fisher
[1920] 1i3 S. C. 287, 1o2 S. E. 325, with comment in [1921] 30 YALE LAw
JOURNAL, 174, as to certain effects of a wrongful repudiation.) This would in
itself be a rather surprising decision, giving an advantage to a contract repudiator
and denying it to one who performs without repudiating. But no repudiation or
breach by the plaintiff is relied on, and the court merely speaks of "in approaching
breach."
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under an existing legal duty t is s ffi i t i eration
12 Kil~g v. uluth, . & . y. o. (189S) 61 i . , . . lIOS;
Lil~Z v. Schuck (1907) 106 . 0, tl. ; i , .
.. It appeared that the efe a ts t ll i . l i t ,
ith the ne pro ise a i r r t l i r
by hi , the entire extra c st f til .
have such pay ents r it i t t i i l i 's
lien action to collect a ala ce. r t i it
lose, irrespective of hether t eir r i t
ade ere specifically irecte t t
pro ise and not as pay ents e eral t. t
gifts, even if t s i r ti , t t
recall t e r t l t l t n
on this reasoning ho ever.
If t l i tiff i it l re i i i
H01~g, HOO1~, t l. . m ai ) S t t r
extin is · his c tr t l ; s stit a sec t p
t s e a li t c rt t h l t
required by t ri i l a still conti i t . ( co t
Pr fess r Coo in [ 32 W JO , 38 ; als v. isher
[1 1I S. . , 10 . . S, it co i [1 Y L L W
JOU , 1 , as t cert effects of a r re i i oul in
its lf a r t s r decisio , i i an advant to a contr t re
a den i it to one ho perf r ith t re iati . ut no repudiati or
bre b th pl~inti is relied on, and t court erely spea s of "a appr
breach." .
